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ABSTRACT 
 
SU, EMILY M. Hospital merger and acquisition effects on healthcare quality and cost. 
Department of Economics, June 2017.  
ADVISOR: PROFESSOR DOUGLASS KLEIN 
 
Healthcare is as much a business subject to market dynamics as it is a public 
service, with enormous sums of money and resources devoted to it. Since a person’s 
health is one of his or her most valuable assets, healthcare will always be in high demand, 
regardless of the price of medical goods and services. Considering healthcare’s nature as 
a necessary good and the irreplaceable importance of a medical facility to its service area, 
any changes in capacity or method of healthcare delivery may have profound effects on 
the dependent population.  
Situations in which a hospital merges with a healthcare system or another hospital 
exemplify such a change, for mergers entail potentially large-scale alterations to the local 
healthcare market and to the manner in which care is provided. The number of hospital 
mergers and acquisitions has been steadily increasing since 2003, with the number of 
deals growing over 40 percent from 2010 to 2015.  
A concern is that larger institutions or systems wield greater market power and 
may gain the ability to control the majority of healthcare delivery in the local area; this 
decrease in competition can lead to rising costs without comparable improvements in 
quality. On the other hand, consolidations can also present the opportunity for better 
integration and efficiency of care, more abundant and valuable technological resources, 
elimination of duplicate services, collaboration among more adept healthcare providers, 
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and overall cost savings from economies of scale. This study explores the effects of 
hospital consolidation and resultant operational changes on patient outcomes and the 
costs associated with their care. Furthermore, the effect of hospital ownership status on 
quality and cost measures will also be assessed. This thesis differs from existing literature 
because it is the first known study to use hospital-level data from 2010 to 2014 to analyze 
whether hospital mergers significantly affect healthcare quality and cost.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Hospital administrators involved in mergers believe that hospital consolidation 
poses many benefits to not only the business and operations facet of medicine but also the 
direct line provision of healthcare service. They argue that mergers improve efficiency as 
well as access to and quality of care. Additionally, healthcare costs may decrease because 
in theory, the more care a hospital provides, the more efficient and less expensive it 
should become through economies of scale and scope; better access to skilled healthcare 
professionals and medical technologies should improve care delivery overall and 
ultimately benefit patient outcomes (Curfman, 2015; Ferrier and Valdmanis, 2004; Harris 
et al., 2000).  
 Despite the appeal of the consolidation business decision to the entities directly 
involved in the transaction, many health economists, rival hospitals, and healthcare 
consumers are rightfully wary of the growing number of hospital mergers. When 
individual hospitals merge into larger systems, their growing patient base and market 
share give them greater leverage over health insurance companies for higher 
reimbursement rates. These higher prices, in turn, fall to consumers in the form of higher 
premiums. Therefore, from the patient perspective, mergers may be unfavorable because 
of their potential to drive up healthcare costs (Curfman, 2015; Ferrier and Valdmanis, 
2004; Harris et al., 2000).   
 The issue of hospital mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has been debated for 
years because they carry different costs and benefits for different constituents. Amidst the 
perpetual effort toward healthcare quality improvement and cost reduction consequent the 
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, hospital, 
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health system, and hospital association leaders have contended that healthcare reform 
compels them to consolidate. On the other hand, others argue that mergers will, above all 
else, result in increased prices. As a result, merging hospitals continue to face scrutiny 
from healthcare providers and patients to prove the value of M&A deals and the benefits 
they provide to consumers. It is of question whether the theoretically improved capacity 
for procedural and clinical integration associated with mergers will actually come to 
fruition, for healthcare institutions with dissimilar missions, cultures, and operational 
structures may be unable to overcome the difficulties of achieving true assimilation of 
services. In light of these obstacles, however, integration strategies that capitalize on the 
distinct capabilities of the merging entities have been found to be successful; merging 
assets to maximize collaborative opportunities, to increase quality of care through greater 
available resources and expertise, and to contain costs via economies of scale will lead to 
more efficient, reliable, and accessible healthcare goods and services (Barnet et al., 
2014).  
 Though there has been some distinction made in previous literature between local 
multi-hospital systems and local mergers – the former of which involves two or more 
hospitals that maintain separate physical facilities, do business under separate licenses, 
and keep separate financial records, and the latter of which involves two or more 
hospitals that do business under a single license, report unified financial records, and may 
or may not consolidate some physical facilities – both consolidations between health 
systems and hospitals as well as mergers between two individual hospitals will be 
considered (Dranove and Lindrooth, 2003).  
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The remainder of this thesis will analyze the various costs and benefits 
accompanying both such M&A transactions in further detail. The organization of the 
ensuing discussion is as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the current 
healthcare industry and hospital consolidation trends. Chapter 3 is a literature review on 
hospital mergers and their effects on healthcare quality and cost. Chapter 4 introduces the 
statistical model to be tested and describes the data that will be used, followed by the 
results of the model in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 will then discuss the results of the previous 
chapter in a broader healthcare context. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a 
summary of important findings and provides recommendations and implications for 
further research.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
BACKGROUND ON THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY 
 
The medical industry comprises a robust collection of sectors that provide 
curative, preventive, rehabilitative, and palliative care to ailing patients. Considering the 
necessity of and increasing demand for its goods and services, healthcare is one of the 
world’s largest and fastest-growing industries. Medical expenditures in the United States 
alone stood at $3.2 trillion in 2015, accounting for 17.8 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) (Appendix A). Of the $3.9 trillion allocated for federal spending in 2016, $588 
billion was spent on Medicare and $368 billion on Medicaid (Appendix B). In 2014 
Medicare and Medicaid spending comprised 20 percent and 16 percent of total national 
healthcare expenditures, respectively, while private health insurance spending and out-of-
pocket spending made up 33 percent and 11 percent of the total. Additionally, hospital 
expenditures, physician and clinical services expenditures, and prescription drug 
spending all experienced greater growth rates relative to those in 2013. Households and 
the federal government together sponsored the majority of total health spending in 2014 
(54 percent), private businesses accounted for 20 percent, state and local governments for 
17 percent, and finally other private revenues for 7 percent (Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services). Since medical expenditures consume over 10 percent of GDP in 
most developed countries, healthcare can represent an enormous part of a nation’s 
economy (The Commonwealth Fund) (Appendix C).   
In response to this perpetually growing demand for and cost of healthcare, the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was passed in 2010 to provide 
consumers more affordable, accessible, and higher quality healthcare services. With more 
complete realization of its provisions in 2014, the ACA requires insurers to accept all 
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applicants, cover a specific list of conditions, and charge the same rates regardless of pre-
existing conditions or sex. Additionally, inaugurating a Patient’s Bill of Rights has 
allowed consumers greater control of their care, a capacity facilitated by coverage 
expansions and premium subsidies (Health and Human Services). Furthermore, for 2015 
to 2025, medical spending is projected to grow at an average rate of 5.8 percent per year, 
1.3 percentage points faster than GDP (Appendix D). For 2015 to 2016, continued 
enrollment growth in Medicaid and the marketplaces as well as enrollment increases in 
employer-sponsored plans have substantially reduced the uninsured population without 
drastically changing the growth rate in health spending. However, this growth is expected 
to accelerate and average 5.7 percent for 2017 through 2019 as a result of gradual 
increases in economy-wide and medical-specific prices; moreover, greater household 
disposable income will likely contribute to rising healthcare costs consequent higher use 
and intensity of medical goods and services. Finally, projected average growth surges to 
6.0 percent for 2020 to 2025 due to strong Medicare enrollment growth amongst baby 
boomers and an increasingly higher share of Medicaid beneficiaries comprising 
comparatively aged and disabled individuals. Thus, by 2025, over one-fifth of the 
country’s expenses will be attributed to medical care (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services).  
A wide variety of healthcare institutions offer goods and services throughout the 
U.S., and all operate slightly differently in compliance with federal regulations and in 
response to local market dynamics. In 2014 the American Hospital Association (AHA) 
registered 5,627 U.S. hospitals, which include nongovernment not-for-profit community 
hospitals, investor-owned for-profit community hospitals, state and local government 
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community hospitals, federal government hospitals, nonfederal psychiatric hospitals, 
nonfederal long term care hospitals, and hospital units of institutions. In addition to these 
categorizations, hospitals are also indexed according to their location and affiliation with 
other healthcare entities. Approximately 54.6 percent and 33.0 percent of all registered 
hospitals are in urban and rural communities, respectively, and a majority of hospitals 
belong to a system (56.6 percent) compared to a network (28.8 percent); a system is 
either a multihospital or a diversified single hospital system, and a network involves a 
group of hospitals, physicians, other providers, insurers and/or community agencies that 
collectively coordinate and deliver a broad spectrum of services to their community. 
Altogether, annual expenses in 2014 for all AHA registered hospitals totaled to nearly $9 
billion (American Hospital Association).  
It is apparent that healthcare constitutes a considerable national expense in the 
U.S., and its projected growth will continue to outpace GDP growth and eventually make 
healthcare costs unsustainable. Even with the passage of federal policies aimed at 
healthcare reform, the constant goal of reducing medical expenditures while improving 
care access and quality remains elusive. Since hospitals are both service and business 
entities, they may choose to engage in transactions, such as consolidation deals, to 
increase their capacity to provide better care with more available resources and efficient 
processes. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A REVIEW OF HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
HEALTHCARE QUALITY AND COST 
 
In light of growing strategic, economic, and regulatory pressures, one of the most 
prevalent trends in today’s dynamic healthcare industry involves hospital consolidation to 
form larger systems capable of capitalizing on broader service reach and economics of 
scale (Yanci et al., 2013). Existing literature analyzes an array of merger predispositions 
and ramifications and discusses many factors that drive the business decision as well as 
resulting quality and cost outcomes. 
 
3.A. Macro level of hospital consolidation and competition 
 Before considering the direct effects of mergers on the particular entities involved 
in the transaction, it is important to examine the consequences on the local healthcare 
markets as a whole. Hospital consolidation may seem favorable from a broader 
perspective of increased capital and resources, but its effect on industry competition and 
market power may significantly alter the quality of care delivery and cost to patients. 
 
3.A.1. Arguments for hospital consolidation 
Advocates for hospital consolidation argue that mergers provide the opportunity 
to share clinical services and resources, capitalize on economies of scale, eliminate 
duplication, and ultimately improve healthcare quality without increasing cost (Chang et 
al, 2016; Connor et al., 1997; Frakt, 2015; Xu et al., 2015). High-volume institutions are 
more likely to benefit from increased operational efficiency and cost savings associated 
with economies of scale; reducing unused capacity through pooled staffing and 
eliminating duplicative services place merged entities in a better financial position with 
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more streamlined and effective production processes (Connor et al., 1997; Hayford, 
2012). The resulting efficient and standardized operations as well as more experienced 
healthcare providers, higher volumes of specialized procedures can yield better surgical 
outcomes (Connor et al., 1997). Merged facilities can also share high-performing 
infrastructure resources like electronic medical records (EMRs) and have better access to 
a greater range and amount of capital (Chang et al., 2016; Connor et al., 1997). 
Additionally, mergers may be accompanied by attainment of not only physical capital but 
also human capital as larger, more capable medical facilities attract increasingly skilled 
professionals and garner greater patient bases from broader geographic and network 
coverage (Alexander et al., 1996; Connor et al., 1997). Financial gains through merges 
strengthen the capacity to invest substantially in quality-improvement health technology 
and personnel (Alexander et al., 1996; Tsai and Jha, 2014). Even though greater 
resources may not be invested in quality improvements, they are unlikely to reduce 
quality; thus, the financial impact of a merger on quality should be, at worst, neutral 
(Hayford, 2012).  
 
3.A.2. Effects of competition on the healthcare industry 
While proponents of hospital consolidation contend that efficient integration of 
care and economies of scale drive quality improvement and cost reduction, a decrease in 
competition consequent mergers has been shown to have opposite effects (Chang et al., 
2016; Frakt, 2015). Isolating the effect of reduced competition on quality of care has 
revealed an increase in the number of procedures but also an increase in inpatient 
mortality (Hayford, 2012).  
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In a competitive market, providers must always strive to outperform their rivals in 
order to attract patients. Therefore, the presence of competition provides a strong drive to 
improve quality of services. Furthermore, healthy competition among providers for 
inclusion in a network’s patient base enables insurers to negotiate lower reimbursement 
rates, which translate to lower insurance costs for consumers and employers (Ramirez, 
2014). There has also been evidence suggesting that hospitals in competitive markets 
tend to have better management, possibly because poor management is associated with 
more substantial costs (Tsai and Kha, 2014).  
It is not to say that partnership between healthcare entities to any degree adversely 
affects; most of the leading quality and safety successes in medicine, such as the 
implementation of the World Health Organization (WHO) Surgical Safety Checklist and 
near elimination of bloodstream infections in hospitals, have resulted from hospital 
collaborations. However, these were collaboratives formed by competing hospitals rather 
than within one system under common ownership (Xu et al., 2015).  
 
3.A.3. Local hospital market dynamics 
In addition to analyzing the prevalence of competition, it is important to consider 
other dynamics of the healthcare markets in which mergers occur. The geographic and 
economic natures of merging entities are also relevant considerations because cross-
market mergers have been shown to differ from within-market mergers, controlling for 
commonalities shared across both merger types like changes in bargaining skill, 
managerial practices, service mix, and cost structures (Dafny, 2016). Within a market, 
merged facilities appear to retain most of their market share several years after the 
merger, and zip codes with larger shares of patients who are discharged by merged 
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facilities are affected proportionally to their share (Hayford, 2012). The identities of the 
medical institutions present in the market also influence how these entities interact and 
how mergers affect healthcare costs.  
Merger-related price reductions have been found to be considerably less in market 
areas with higher market concentration levels, and such reductions in areas with higher 
health maintenance organization (HMO) penetration were approximately twice those in 
areas with lower HMO penetration (Connor et al., 1997). Furthermore, consolidations 
may alter the competitive dynamics of local healthcare markets, pressuring rival hospitals 
to improve their quality of care to increase their competitive advantage against growing 
hospital systems and to retain bargaining power with insurance companies (Chang et al., 
2016). Although surrounding hospitals may be compelled to reform their healthcare 
practices in attempt to remain competitive, the merged entity itself may adopt a degree of 
stagnating complacency. Larger, post-merger systems or hospitals may be less motivated 
to join health information exchanges, which allow for the meaningful data sharing, 
systems for effective patient handoffs, and streamlined care transitions, because they 
assume they already capture a large proportion of patients’ clinical information 
internally; they may see information as a tool to retain patients, not to improve care (Tsai 
and Jha, 2014). Moreover, conglomerate hospitals created from mergers have the 
potential to wield considerable market power and to make decisions regarding the care 
offerings for a large patient population.  
The absence of robust competition may incentivize such hospitals to focus on the 
most profitable services rather than to maintain the infrastructure for a fuller range of 
services or to pursue continuous quality improvement. These actions present risk to a 
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population if a monopoly hospital system within a market fails; population health would 
suffer, and greater threat endangers rural areas where one hospital system serves as the 
only source of medical care (Xu et al., 2015). Therefore, it is essential to consider not 
only the benefits of greater operational capacity consequent consolidation but also the 
potential harm that can follow if merged hospitals become powerful enough in their 
markets such that their priorities shift away from improving patient care to other, less 
altruistic goals.   
 
3.B. Hospital characteristics 
 Hospital type and other general characteristics can affect the likelihood of a 
merge, structural and operational changes subsequent consolidation, and how mergers 
impact healthcare quality and cost. Furthermore, the number of patients, capable 
physicians, and overall volume of procedures in a hospital are important determinants of 
the ability to deliver appropriate care with improvements in patient outcomes paralleling 
decreases in costs.   
 
3.B.1. Hospital size and ownership type  
Connor, et al (1997) found that merging hospitals were less likely to have been 
government-owned and more likely to have been part of a system, were larger in terms of 
numbers of beds and admissions, had higher occupancy rates and case-mix indexes, and 
had higher expenses and revenues per adjusted admission. Despite the perception of 
mergers as an eventuality of one or two hospitals that do not have the resources to 
function optimally independently, little evidence suggests that smaller institutions cannot 
make the investments needed to improve care delivery. Small hospitals are comparable 
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with larger ones in adopting new health information technology, for example, and many 
quality improvement interventions, like checklists, are inexpensive and can be 
successfully implemented with strong leadership and commitment (Tsai and Jha, 2014). 
Size has been found to have post-merger ramifications, for mergers between hospitals of 
dissimilar size have resulted in a decrease in the number of beds in the new facility and 
an increase in both the nurses and total personnel per average daily census, changes that 
could possibly have helped ameliorate staffing shortages present in the pre-merged 
hospitals (Alexander et al., 1996).   
Hospital ownership has been found to play a role in affecting quality and cost of 
care. Horwitz et al. (2005) found that the medical services hospitals provide vary 
markedly by ownership depending on their differing priorities; proprietary hospitals are 
more likely to offer relatively profitable services, government hospitals are most likely to 
offer relatively unprofitable services that are disproportionately needed by poor and 
underinsured patients, and nonprofit hospitals fall in between by balancing profit-seeking 
and serving the poor. An example of this phenomenon is the observation that among 
comparable hospitals, for-profits are the most likely to offer open-heart surgery above 
nonprofits and then public hospitals, sequentially (Horwitz, 2005).  
Nonprofit and for-profit hospitals are privately owned and operated and thus may 
have greater access to resources than publicly-owned government hospitals. A 
phenomenon known as the “infrastructure inequality trap” represents when government 
funding is increasingly attracted towards private hospitals and away from public hospitals 
because private patients can afford to pay for greater infrastructure at private hospitals. 
As a result, private hospitals have a greater capacity to accept more government funds 
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and skilled healthcare personnel to promote healthcare quality improvement (Basu et al., 
2012). Akinci et al. (2005) also underlines the importance of physical appearance and 
technological capabilities in patient perceptions of hospital competence.  
Between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, however, the majority of the studies 
that have analyzed healthcare data representative of U.S. hospitals have found that for-
profit hospitals tend to have higher mortality or other adverse event rates than nonprofit 
hospitals. On average, for-profit hospitals have been found to have higher mortality 
among elderly patients with heart disease (McClellan and Staiger, 2000). On the other 
hand, it can be speculated that for-profit hospitals may provide higher quality care on 
easily monitored dimensions that are critical for determining reimbursement amounts but 
pay less attention to harder-to-monitor quality measures (Sloan et al., 2001). Amidst the 
various findings, it has also been concluded that hospital ownership does not make an 
apparent difference in quality outcomes, such as readmission rate to a hospital for the 
same diagnosis and mortality rates several months after discharge (McClellan and 
Staiger, 2000; Sloan and Taylor, 1999; Sloan et al., 2001). 
When analyzing how ownership status impacts patient’s perceived quality of 
hospital care, as opposed to examining the differences in actual patient health outcomes 
measures, hospital ownership does seem to have various effects different from those 
discussed previously on mortality and readmission rates. Since nonprofit and government 
hospitals do not place primary emphasis on earning a net profit, it is not uncommon for 
news of their high debt-to-asset ratios to shape consumer opinions in the media (Sloan et 
al., 2003). Consumers, therefore, form views that nonprofit and government hospitals 
have poor competence and that for-profit hospitals are better coordinated, have shorter 
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wait times, and more streamlined clinical pathways in order to minimize waste and 
maximize profit (Drevs et al., 2014). Proprietary hospitals, however, also suffer from 
perceptions of a conflict of interest because they provide healthcare goods and services 
while also aiming to make a profit. To address this discord between economic and 
altruistic strategic goals, for-profit hospitals sometimes affiliate with social causes or 
welfare initiatives (Lichtenstein et al., 2004).  
Beyond competence, the level of comfort and perception of affectionate care 
afforded by a hospital to its patients are also crucial determinants of patient satisfaction 
that vary with ownership type. Nonprofit hospitals tend to score the highest in humane, 
fair, and personalized care (Schlesinger et al., 2004a; Schlesinger et al., 2004b). For-
profit hospitals are not perceived well with regard to these considerations because 
consumers may feel as though they are not treated as individuals but as cases. Proprietary 
hospitals’ principal focus on cost-reduction strategies, profit margins, and efficiency can 
convey a view of patient care as simply increasing volume and throughput (Comondore 
et al., 2009). Some for-profit hospitals have strived to eliminate this negative perception 
of lack of care for individualized patient needs by implementing customer relationship 
management programs (Akinci et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2008). Therefore, the different 
priorities and available resources of each of the three hospital types may have a more 
significant effect on shaping patient perceptions and satisfaction of care than on the 
actual outcomes measures themselves.      
 
3.B.2. Hospital and surgeon volume of operative procedures 
Consolidation almost invariably entails increases in hospital and surgeon volume 
for acquired hospitals due to a more expansive patient base, provider workforce, and 
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institutional capacity.  As a result, healthcare quality is likely to be higher in medical 
facilities consequent a merger because high-volume hospitals may have more surgeons 
who specialize in specific procedures, more consistent processes for postoperative care, 
better-staffed intensive care units (ICUs), and greater resources, in general to handle 
postoperative complications (Birkmeyer et al., 2002). There is considerable evidence that 
patients undergoing various types of complex treatments or high-risk surgical procedures 
have lower mortality rates and otherwise better outcomes if care is provided in hospitals 
with a high caseload of patients with the same condition (Hayford, 2012; Kizer, 2003). 
For instance, hospital mergers are associated with increased utilization of intensive heart 
surgeries and greater treatment intensity, both in the type of treatment utilized and in the 
number of procedures received during a hospital stay (Hayford, 2012). For most 
conditions other than a small number of technically difficult surgeries like 
esophagectomy and pancreatectomy, however, the benefits of volume may be less 
pronounced; volume effects usually diminish past a critical threshold that most hospitals 
already reach for many procedures. Emerging evidence suggests that volume may simply 
be a proxy for other processes, such as having systems well-adept to recognize and 
effectively manage complications (Tsai and Kha, 2014).  
In addition to increases in overall hospital volume for surgical procedures, 
surgeon volume and the average experience of operating surgeons also increase due to 
greater staffing capabilities and employment appeal following a merger. A larger surgeon 
team with more expertise is much more likely to improve patient surgical outcomes, and 
patients treated by high-volume surgeons have been shown to have lower operative 
mortality rates than those cared for by low-volume surgeons, regardless of the surgical 
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volume of the hospital in which they practiced (Birkmeyer et al., 2003; Kizer, 2003). 
Surgeon volume was found to be inversely related to operative mortality for eight 
cardiovascular or cancer resection procedures, and for certain types of such procedures, 
patients could significantly increase their chances of survival by selecting surgeons who 
perform the operations frequently (Kizer, 2003). The adjusted odds ratio for operative 
death varies widely according to the procedure, and surgeon volume accounts for a large 
proportion of the apparent effect of hospital volume (Birkmeyer et al., 2003).   
 
3.C. Quality measures 
 One of the chief considerations in healthcare is patient quality outcomes and 
satisfaction scores, for medicine is ultimately a service for the good of the public. 
Therefore, there is pressure on merging entities to be able to justify the transaction with 
improving scores on various quality measures. 
 
3.C.1. Mortality, complication, and readmission rates  
Mortality and readmission rates represent two hallmarks of healthcare quality, and 
much research has focused on surgical outcomes measures. Although increases in volume 
that arise from consolidation have been seen to have positive effects on surgical mortality 
rates, the overall consequences of mergers on healthcare quality are mixed. Previous 
research on the effects of hospital mergers on certain procedures revealed inconsistent 
changes in risk-adjusted complication rate; lumbar and lumbosacral fusion of the 
posterior column and total hip replacement saw decreases in risk-adjusted complication 
rate; transurethral prostatectomy, cervical fusion of the anterior column, and total knee 
replacement experienced increased rates; and laparoscopic colectomy and lumbar and 
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lumbosacral fusion of the anterior column saw no change in complication rate. 
Furthermore, the comorbidity rate of obesity for patients of consolidated hospitals was 
found to be greater post-consolidation (Chang et al., 2016). Additionally, to contrast the 
decreased adjusted mortality rates found for selected cardiovascular and cancer 
procedures discussed previously, merger completion is also associated with increased 
utilization of bypass surgery and angioplasty as well as increased inpatient mortality 
(Hayford, 2012).  
Previous studies have also researched the extent to which mortality and 
readmission rates are related. Some existing literature has found a modest association 
between 30-day mortality and readmission rates for heart failure (Krumholz et al., 2013; 
McIlvennan et al., 2015). Krumholz et al. (2013) found that risk-standardized mortality 
and readmission rates were not associated for patients admitted for heart attack or 
pneumonia and were only weakly, negatively associated for patients admitted with heart 
failure. Another study by Ho and Hamilton (2000) compared the quality of hospital care 
before and after mergers and acquisitions in California between 1992 and 1995 and found 
no measurable impact on inpatient AMI mortality and increased AMI 90-day readmission 
rates in some cases. 
Finally, though mergers allow for financial savings due to infrastructure 
consolidation, some patients may be required to travel farther for care. Additional travel 
time, even in urban or hospital-dense areas, has been found to increase mortality from 
myocardial infarctions (Hayford et al., 2012). Therefore, hospital consolidation does not 
seem to uniformly impact postoperative mortality or readmission rates.  
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3.C.2. Patient satisfaction scores   
Patient experience of care has also become an important consideration in 
evaluating healthcare quality. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) 
Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) 
provides a national, standardized survey instrument and data collection methodology for 
measuring patients’ perspectives on hospital care. This survey allows for valid 
comparisons to be made across all hospitals in the U.S. (HCAHPS Hospital Survey). One 
of the HCAHPS global measures, patients’ overall ratings of their hospitals, has been 
positively associated with hospital performance on CMS clinical process of care 
measures for AMI, HF, PN, and surgical care (Isaac et al., 2010; Jha et al., 2008). 
Mortality and readmission rates conditions such as heart attack, heart failure, and 
pneumonia have shown improvement consequent the start of public reporting and 
inclusion of these measures in the CMS’s pay-for-performance (P4P) programs (Griffey 
and Kosowsky, 2007; Price et al., 2014; Suter et al., 2014). Higher patient satisfaction has 
been found to be associated with improved guideline adherence and lower risk-adjusted 
inpatient mortality rates for heart attack patients (Glickman et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
hospitals with the highest patient satisfaction scores have lower 30-day mortality and 
readmission rates compared to hospitals with the lowest patient satisfaction scores (Tsai 
et al., 2015). Finally, it is not only outcomes metrics that play a role in determining 
patient experience but also process of care measures. Hospitals with consistently poor 
performance on cardiac process measures have also been found to possess lower patient 
satisfaction on average, an association suggesting that these hospitals have overall poor 
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quality of care (Girotra et al., 2012). Research on the effects of hospital mergers on 
HCAHPS scores is limited, and no conclusive evidence from multiple studies has 
suggested any significant impacts.  
 
 
3.D. Healthcare cost  
 Medical expenditures comprise a relatively large proportion of the country’s 
GDP, and containing its rapid growth is one of the nation’s primary concerns. Whether 
M&A transactions result in increased or decreased costs is still a topic of contention, and 
assessing the effects of mergers on the operational performance of the involved entities is 
important to consider. 
 
3.D.1. Costs 
Similar to quality, healthcare costs have also experienced variable impacts as a 
result of hospital mergers. In instances in which lesser performing hospitals consolidate 
through a merger or acquisition, the act can allow for cost savings, increased market 
power, and economies of scale (Chang et al., 2016). Moreover, merger-related price 
reductions have been found to be greater for low-occupancy hospitals, nonteaching 
hospitals, non-system hospitals, similar-size hospitals, and hospitals with greater pre-
merger service duplication (Connor et al., 1997).  
Despite these findings, many studies have shown the opposite effect that hospital 
consolidation raises prices upwards of 45 percent with little to no corresponding 
improvements in quality (Dafny, 2014; Gaynor and Town, 2012; Ramirez, 2014; Xu et 
al., 2015). In considering the rival distance to merged entities, there has also been 
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evidence indicating substantial post-merger price increases by rivals of merging hospitals 
(Dafny, 2005). Price increases may arise through two mechanisms in settings in which a 
single payer negotiates with both providers. The common customer effect is generated 
when the insurer competes for customers who value both merging providers, and the 
common insurer effect exists even in the absence of common customers. Cross-market 
mergers in the same state resulted in price increases of roughly 6 to 10 percent, while 
those linking hospitals to out-of-state providers did not result in statistically meaningful 
changes in price; mergers of proximate hospitals may lead to the largest price effects 
(Dafny et al., 2016). The majority of existing literature seems to suggest higher 
healthcare costs as a result of hospital mergers.  
 
3.D.2. Hospital operating efficiency 
Incongruent with the substantial support for higher prices without compensating 
benefits consequent hospital consolidation, mergers may produce short-term 
improvements in operating efficiency on measures such as the number of duplicate tests 
and the regional variation in medical practice (Quality Forum). For all merger types, 
operational areas such as operating efficiency, occupancy rate, and expenses per adjusted 
admissions were all positively impacted, and trends toward inefficiency were arrested 
somewhat after merger (Alexander et al., 1996). Additionally, because mergers often 
create avenues whereby to consolidate two small clinical departments into one larger 
unit, they can reduce the relative variability of daily patient census as well as the 
associated costs of staffing adequately for random periods of high demand (Lynk, 1995). 
 
Su 21 
 
3.E. Concerns regarding mergers  
 Since mergers continue to occur amidst the debates regarding its different costs 
and benefits depending on the constituents in question, third party institutions have some 
control over the outcome of consolidation propositions; these organizations strive to 
make objective decisions about merger deals after taking into account their possible 
effects on both the macro and micro scale.  
3.E.1. Hazards of mergers 
The main potential hazards of mergers to parties other than the consolidating 
hospitals or hospital systems are decreased competition, higher prices, and reduced 
geographic access because of consolidation (Connor et al., 1997). Even though there has 
been some evidence suggesting that mergers reduce costs, improve healthcare quality, 
and increase operational efficiency, many of these benefits can be achieved without 
consolidation. The volume-quality relation of better health outcomes with higher 
numbers of procedures as well as better triaging of patients to the best physician can be 
addressed through interoperability of EHRs and better transparency. Proliferation of large 
hospital systems in low-competition marketplaces may fail to improve outcomes and also 
could encourage greater health care utilization that may drive up costs and induce 
iatrogenic illness. Furthermore, infrastructure consolidation may require some patients to 
travel farther for care, resulting in more intensive procedures and higher mortality. 
Finally, hospitals that own expensive equipment, such as radiation machines, are more 
likely to refer patients for in-system treatment over other treatment options, leading to 
potentially more suboptimal care and overtreatment in large health systems (Xu et al., 
2015).  
Su 22 
 
 
3.E.2. Antitrust organizations 
Considering the dangers associated with hospital consolidations, antitrust 
organizations can be justifiably concerned that mergers in concentrated markets will 
erode competition, increase prices, and reduce consumer welfare (Connor et al., 1997; 
Dafny, 2014).  Antitrust laws play a crucial role in ensuring that consumers benefit from 
robust market competition. Such necessary competition leads to lower costs and higher-
quality services and encourages investment and innovation. The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) intervenes when there is strong evidence that a merger between 
healthcare providers is likely to result in market power that will cause an increase in 
prices through higher insurance premiums and copayments without corresponding quality 
improvements. The FTC showed that there are different ways other than a merger for 
hospitals to achieve the benefits of clinical integration, such as the use of clinical practice 
protocols to ensure consistent treatment and financial incentives for meeting quality-of-
care goals (Ramirez, 2014). 
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CHAPTER 4 
STATISTICAL MODEL: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS 
 
Difference-in-differences (DID) analysis will be used to compare changes in risk-
adjusted complication rate of certain elective operations performed nationally one year 
prior to consolidation (pre-consolidation) and the year after consolidation (post-
consolidation) between the consolidated hospitals and the matched control group. Chang 
et al. (2016) conducted a similar study with patient-level data from the Health Care Cost 
and Utilization Project State Inpatient Database for California and Florida. They 
identified 19 hospitals that consolidated between 2007 and 2013 and propensity matched 
them with 19 independent hospitals, using patient and hospital characteristics. This study 
will compare a sample of 20 merged hospitals from 2011, 8 merged hospitals from 2012, 
and 16 merged hospitals from 2013 with a matching number of unmerged, control 
hospitals from each corresponding year. Hospitals were matched according to number of 
beds, and quality and cost data were obtained from 2010 to 2014. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA AND RESULTS 
 
The main purpose of this study is to test whether a hospital merger or acquisition 
has a significant impact on the target hospital’s patient outcomes and Medicare 
reimbursements. Equation 1 was used for the basic DID analysis employing an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression in which quality outcomes were a function of three 
dummy variables: AFTER, whether the quality data was from the year before or after that 
of the merge; MERGED, the status of the hospital as merged or unmerged; and 
AFTER*MERGED, the interaction term. These three independent variables were 
included to analyze not only the individual effects of time and merger status on hospital 
quality scores but also, most importantly, the combined effect of participation in a merger 
deal on the quality of care provided over time.  
 
OUTCOME = β1AFTER + β2MERGED + β3AFTER*MERGED + ε                    (1) 
 
This study uses data on hospital mergers and acquisitions (M&A) from Irving 
Levin Associates, a company that has been providing market intelligence for healthcare 
M&A markets for over 60 years (Irving Levin Associates). Irving Levin Associates is the 
leading publisher of business intelligence for investors in healthcare M&A and finance, 
and it is the most well-recognized and reliable source of catalogued hospital merger deals 
in the nation. Information on 2011, 2012, and 2013 hospital M&As was obtained from 
the comprehensive lists outlined in Irving Levin Associates’s annual The Health Care 
Services Acquisition Reports. Data of interest comprised the target name, listing, 
Su 25 
 
location, and units, as well as the acquirer name, listing, and location. Terms of the deals 
were also collected.  
Analysis of healthcare quality metrics and costs involved panel data from CMS’S 
Hospital Compare, an online database with information on quality of care and median 
reimbursements provided by and to Medicare-certified hospitals throughout the U.S. 
Datasets were obtained from the Hospital Compare data archive for 2010 to 2014, using 
the most updated annual files available. Since this study aimed to analyze the changes in 
patient outcomes from one year prior to the merge event to one year after, this five-year 
span of quality data was necessary to encompass the three years of merger deals. Table 1 
presents all of the variables utilized in the regression analyses along with their detailed 
descriptions. 
 
Table 1. Variable descriptions.  
Note: The descriptions are taken from CMS Hospital Compare’s data dictionaries and cms.gov. 
Variables Descriptions 
MORT_AMI 30-day death rate for heart attack patients 
READM_AMI 30-day rate of unplanned readmission for heart attack patients 
MORT_HF 30-day death rate for heart failure patients 
READM_HF 30-day rate of unplanned readmission for heart failure patients 
MORT_PN 30-day death rate for pneumonia patients 
READM_PN 30-day rate of unplanned readmission for pneumonia patients 
HSP_9_10 Percentage of patients who gave their hospital a rating of 9 or 10 on a 
scale from 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest) 
REC_Y Percentage of patients who reported YES, they would definitely 
recommend the hospital 
GOVT Public hospital owned by a government and receives government funding 
NONPROFIT Private hospital owned by nonprofit corporations or religious 
organizations that invests all profits in the organization and is 
exempt from paying income and property taxes 
FORPROFIT Private hospital owned by corporates or individuals that distributes 
profits to investors, raises capital through investors, and pays 
income and property taxes 
PAYM_AMI Median Medicare payment for heart attack patients, discharged alive with 
MCC (MS-DRG 280) 
PAYM_HF Median Medicare payment for heart failure patients, discharged alive 
with MCC (MS-DRG 291) 
PAYM_PN Median Medicare payment for pneumonia patients, discharged alive with 
MCC (MS-DRG 193) 
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Hospitals for the merged hospital sample were randomly selected by taking every 
fifth deal listed in the Irving Levin Associates annual reports. Then, the target hospitals 
were located in the Hospital Compare dataset for the corresponding year of the merge, 
the year before, and the year after to ensure data availability. If data were missing for any 
of the eight quality measures, the next deal in the list was taken until a sample with 
complete data was compiled. To create the control sample of comparable hospitals that 
did not undergo a merge or acquisition, the hospitals in the merged sample were matched 
according to number of beds (units) and state to control hospitals listed in the American 
Hospital Directory (American Hospital Directory). Meticulous care was taken in 
selecting comparable hospitals for the control group such that the mean number of units 
was only different by one – 236 beds in the merged hospitals and 237 in the unmerged 
hospitals. The full sample used contains 20 merged hospitals from 2011, 8 merged 
hospitals from 2012, and 16 merged hospitals from 2013, with a matching number of 
unmerged, control hospitals from each corresponding year. Data on all the variables in 
Table 1 were obtained for hospitals in both samples for the year prior to and after the 
merge date of the merged hospital in each merged-unmerged hospital matched pair.  
Data for variables that could potentially have an impact on healthcare outcomes 
were collected from Hospital Compare’s databases. The quality metrics selected were 30-
day acute myocardial infarction (AMI, i.e. heart attack) mortality rate, AMI readmission 
rate, heart failure (HF) mortality rate, HF readmission rate, pneumonia (PN) mortality 
rate, and PN readmission rate. The mortality measures are estimates of deaths for any 
reason in the 30 days after either entering the hospital for a specific condition or having a 
coronary artery bypass graft surgery; the deaths can occur in the hospital or after 
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discharge. The readmission measures are estimates of unplanned readmission for any 
reason to an acute care hospital in the 30 days after discharge from a hospitalization. All-
cause mortality and readmissions are considered because from a patient perspective, any 
death or readmission is an adverse event. Both death and readmission rates are measured 
within 30 days because deaths and readmissions after a longer time period may have less 
to do with the care received in the hospital and more to do with other complicating 
illnesses, patients’ own behavior, or care provided to patients after hospital discharge. 
The death and readmission measures include hospitals for Medicare beneficiaries 65 
years or older, and the readmission measures do not include patients who died during the 
index admission or who left the hospital against medical advice. Furthermore, to 
accurately compare hospital performance, the death and readmission rates are adjusted 
for patient characteristics that may make death or readmission more likely. These 
characteristics include the patient’s age, past medical history, and comorbidities upon 
admission that are known to increase the patient’s chance of dying or of having a 
readmission (Medicare.gov). The readmission and mortality rates for AMI, HF, and PN 
were each regressed on the three dummy variables using Equation 1. 
The three conditions of AMI, HF, and PN were chosen because they were 
included in the Joint Commission’s initial set of core performance measures in 2001. 
Hospitals seeking accreditation were required to submit data on these standardized 
measure sets. Moreover, CMS and the Joint Commission collaborated on the AMI, HF, 
and PN measures to align the specifications that were common to both and subsequently 
set out to make their measure sets identical with common data dictionaries, information 
forms, and algorithms (Joint Commission Specifications Manual). With increasing 
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emphasis on P4P and value-based purchasing (VBP), especially consequent the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), CMS requires hospitals to submit data on 
AMI, HF, and PN and provides financial incentives and bonuses for measurable 
improvements in overall score on these quality measures (Griffey and Kosowsky, 2007).  
  The next variable included as potentially affecting a hospital’s quality of care was 
target hospital ownership. A hospital’s characterization as public or private and profit-
seeking or not-for-profit may drive different incentives that emphasize certain elements 
of the care process for various reasons, but existing literature provides incongruous 
results regarding the effects of hospital ownership on healthcare quality or whether the 
ownership type has any significant impact at all. It has been found that for-profit 
hospitals tend to have higher mortality rates than nonprofit hospitals, but for-profit 
hospitals could also provide higher quality care on principal measures for reimbursement 
(McClellan and Staiger, 2000; Sloan et al., 2001). Even though no significant differences 
in quality outcomes have been found pertaining to hospital ownership, previous studies 
have not considered 30-day mortality rates that are more observable than mortality rates 
after several months and 30-day readmission rates that represent unplanned readmissions 
for any reason (McClellan and Staiger, 2000; Sloan and Taylor, 1999; Sloan et al., 2001).  
All of the hospitals in both the merged and unmerged samples belonged to one of 
three hospital listings: government, voluntary nonprofit, and for-profit.  Only two of the 
three categories, government and for-profit, were given a dummy variable specification 
and included in the regression to avoid multicollinearity in Equation 2. The nonprofit 
listing was omitted from the OLS regression because it contained the majority of the 
hospitals in the study, 73 percent, as shown in Table 3. The constant term represents the 
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nonprofit hospitals, and the coefficients on the government and for-profit dummy 
variables would show differences between hospitals of these two types and the majority 
of hospitals in the market that identify as voluntary nonprofit.  
 
OUTCOME = β1AFTER + β2MERGED + β3AFTER*MERGED + β4GOVT         (2) 
+ β5FORPROFIT +  ε        
 
Previous literature has suggested associations between readmission and mortality 
rates; hospitals with lower mortality rates may have been discharging patients who had a 
greater severity of illness and thus a greater likelihood of being readmitted, or hospitals 
with higher mortality rates could have had patients die before they could be readmitted 
(Krumholz et al., 2013). Therefore, separate OLS tests were done with readmission rates 
for AMI, HF, and PN regressed on the corresponding, condition-specific mortality rates 
in addition to the five dummy variables, as seen in Equation 3. Again, the dummy 
variable for nonprofit hospitals was left out of the regression to prevent multicollinearity 
among the ownership variables. 
 
READM_RATE = β1AFTER + β2MERGED + β3AFTER*MERGED + β4GOVT         (3) 
+ β5FORPROFIT + β6MORT_RATE + ε                   
           
In addition to the six patient outcomes measures, two Hospital Consumer 
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) measures were also 
included in the study. Research indicates that higher patient satisfaction with their care 
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experiences is associated with higher levels of adherence to recommended prevention and 
treatment processes and better clinical outcomes. Furthermore, HCAHPS measures are 
increasingly included in public reporting and P4P programs (Price et al., 2014). Patients’ 
overall ratings of their hospitals have been positively associated with hospital 
performance on CMS clinical process of care measures for AMI, HF, PN, and surgical 
care (Isaac et al., 2010; Jha et al., 2008). Additionally, overall ratings and willingness to 
recommend the hospital were lower in hospitals that consistently performed poorly on 
cardiac process measures (Girotra et al., 2012). Therefore, the global HCAHPS measures 
of overall hospital rating and willingness to recommend hospital were included with 
outcome measures on AMI, HF, and PN to provide a more comprehensive picture of 
hospital quality of care. 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the six mortality and readmission 
rates as well as the two global HCAHPS patient satisfaction measures. Not all 176 
observations reported mortality and readmission rates for AMI. Average readmission 
rates were higher than average mortality rates for all three conditions, with the greatest 
difference between the two for HF, in which readmission rates were nearly twice 
mortality rates. The range of each rate was also fairly wide. Overall, AMI had the highest 
mean mortality rate and HF had the highest readmission rate. For the HCAHPS scores, a 
slightly greater proportion of patients tended to report that they would recommend their 
hospital than would rate the hospital a 9 or 10. Again, the range of values for both patient 
satisfaction measures varied widely, for the maximum percentage of patients answering 
affirmatively to these categories was twice or more than twice the minimum for hospital 
rating and likelihood to recommend, respectively.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for Hospital Compare mortality, readmission, and global HCAHPS quality measures. 
Note: Data taken from CMS Hospital Compare’s databases from 2010 to 2014. 
Variables MORT_AMI READM_AMI MORT_HF READM_HF MORT_PN READM_PN HSP_9_10 REC_Y 
Mean 15.6 18.6 12.0 23.1 13.0 17.8 68.2 70.7 
Median 15.2 19.0 11.3 23.6 11.9 17.8 68.0 71.0 
Maximum 29.0 24.0 28.3 31.6 26.4 26.7 92.0 94.0 
Minimum 10.4 8.6 6.7 9.0 8.3 8.5 46.0 43.0 
Std. Dev. 2.8 2.7 3.5 3.7 3.4 2.3 8.0 9.3 
Number of Observations 175 171 176 176 176 176 176 176 
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With changes in healthcare cost also an important potential consequence of 
hospital mergers, Hospital Compare data on median Medicare payment for three of the 
top seventy utilized Medicare Severity-Diagnosis Related Groups (MS-DRGs) was 
collected. One MS-DRG is assigned to each inpatient stay using the principal diagnosis 
and additional diagnoses, the principal procedure and additional procedures, sex, and 
discharge status. The three DRGs chosen belong to the three conditions under study and 
comprise acute myocardial infarction patients discharged alive with major complication 
or comorbidity (MCC) (MS-DRG 280); heart failure & shock patients with MCC (MS-
DRG 291); and simple pneumonia & pleurisy patients with MCC (MS-DRG 193). As 
part of the hospital inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS), each of these MS-
DRGs has a payment weight assigned to it based on the average resources used to treat 
Medicare patients in that MS-DRG. CMS uses MS-DRGs to better account for severity of 
illness and resource consumption for Medical patients, and MCC represents the highest 
level of severity. The IPPS per-discharge payment is based on two national base payment 
rates, one that provides for operating expenses and the other for capital expenses. These 
standardized payment rates are adjusted to account for the MS-DRG relative weight, or 
the costs associated with the patient’s clinical condition and related treatment relative to 
the costs of the average Medicare case, as well as the wage index, representing market 
conditions in the hospitals’ location relative to national conditions. The same MS-DRG 
weights are used for operating and capital payment rates and are recalibrated annually, 
without affecting overall payments, based on standardized charges and costs for all IPPS 
cases in each MS-DRG. Base operating and capital rates are adjusted by an area wage 
index to reflect the expected differences in local market prices for labor, which is 
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intended to measure difference in hospital wage rates among labor markets by comparing 
the average hourly wage for hospital workers in each urban or statewide rural area to the 
nationwide average. The wage index is revised each year based on wage data reported by 
IPPS hospitals (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services).  
Beginning with discharges occurring on and after October 1, 2012, IPPS 
payments also reflect any applicable adjustments under the Hospital Value-Based 
Purchasing (VBP) Program and Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP). 
Under the Hospital VBP Program, a portion of operating IPPS payments to acute 
inpatient hospitals eligible for the program are reduced to fund value-based incentive 
payments based on hospital overall performance on a set of quality measures. Under the 
HRRP, a portion of eligible hospitals’ IPPS payments are reduced for those hospitals with 
excess 30-day readmissions for conditions including AMI, HF, and PN. Finally, IPPS 
payment has undergone another adjustment starting in fiscal year 2015 consequent the 
Hospital-Acquired Conditions (HACs) Reduction Program, in which overall payments 
are reduce by 1 percent for applicable hospitals in the worst-performing quartile of risk-
adjusted quality measures for reasonable preventable HACs (Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services). 
Median Medicare payment was regressed on the three dummy variables in 
Equation 4 to assess the effects of hospital merger events on healthcare costs over time. 
These payment IDs were chosen because MS-DRG 193 was the only reimbursement 
measure for PN in the 2010 Hospital Compare database, so it was carried through the 
remaining years with the same measures for the other two conditions.  
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MEDICAREPAY = β1AFTER + β2MERGED + β3AFTER*MERGED + ε         (4) 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the three hospital ownership types and 
the three Medicare payment measures. Fifteen percent of the total hospitals were public, 
government-owned; 73 percent were private, voluntary nonprofit; and 11 percent were 
for profit. Not all hospitals reported their median Medicare payments for the three MS-
DRGs under study. Of the individual samples that had data, the mean Medicare 
reimbursements were highest for AMI patients discharged alive with MCC and lowest for 
PN patients discharged alive with MCC. Each MS-DRG had a large range of payment 
variation, with the maximum reimbursement nearly three times the minimum for AMI, 
two times the minimum for HF, and over two times the minimum for PN.   
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for target hospital ownership and median Medicare payment measures. 
Note: Data taken from CMS Hospital Compare’s databases from 2010 to 2014. 
 
All hospitals must make a profit somehow in order to continue operations, but the 
method whereby hospitals increase their revenue differs based on their ownership type. 
Medical services hospitals provide vary markedly by ownership depending on their 
differing priorities; proprietary hospitals are more likely to offer relatively profitable 
services, government hospitals are most likely to offer relatively unprofitable services 
that are disproportionately needed by poor and underinsured patients, and nonprofit 
hospitals fall in between by balancing profit-seeking and serving the poor (Horwitz, 
Variables GOVT NONPROFIT FORPROFIT PAYM_AMI PAYM_HF PAYM_PN 
Mean 0.15 0.73 0.11 11,529.54 9,399.35 9,154.47 
Median 0.00 1.00 0.00 11,104.50 9,032.00 8,822.00 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 19,142.00 14,404.00 14,595.00 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 6,941.00 7,160.07 6,763.58 
Std. Dev. 0.36 0.44 0.32 2,107.41 1,465.84 1,486.83 
Number of Observations 176 176 176 168 175 175 
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2005). Therefore, differences in healthcare services offered may result in different 
Medicare reimbursement amounts, so dummy variables for hospital ownership were 
added to produce Equation 5. 
 
MEDICAREPAY = β1AFTER + β2MERGED + β3AFTER*MERGED + β4GOVT       (5) 
+ β5FORPROFIT +  ε        
 
As the healthcare industry has increasingly evolved to value quality of care, initiatives 
such as CMS’s inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS) and Hospital Value-Based 
Purchasing (VBP) Program reflect the significant role hospital performance has on 
Medicare payments. Incentive payments are awarded under the VBP Program to 
participating hospitals that meet or exceed performance standards and/or improve 
performance during the applicable performance period (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services). Therefore, it was appropriate to test the effect of quality outcomes on 
healthcare costs as well, as shown in Equation 6. The outcomes variable represents the 
six mortality and readmission rates as well as the overall hospital rating. The likelihood 
that a patient would definitely recommend a hospital was omitted from the OLS 
regression because of the high correlation between both global HCAHPS measures of 
0.92, as shown in Table 4. It was more appropriate to include only one of these measures 
to avoid multicollinearity. Furthermore, overall hospital rating is the only HCAHPS 
global measure included in Hospital VBP (HCAHPS Fact Sheet).  
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MEDICAREPAY = β1AFTER + β2MERGED + β3AFTER*MERGED β4GOVT          (6) 
+ β6FORPROFIT + β7OUTCOME + ε      
                               
Table 4 shows the correlation values between every possible pair of variables in 
this study. AMI mortality is the only mortality rate that decreased over time without 
taking into account the presence of a merger event. Average readmission rates and 
median Medicare reimbursements for patients discharged alive with MCC also decreased 
for all three conditions over time. The two global HCAHPS measures, furthermore, 
showed an overall increase across each three-year period spanning a merger year. The 
primary variable of interest, the interaction term AFTER*MERGED, shows a negative 
relationship with readmission rates for all three conditions, median Medicare payment for 
AMI, MS-DRG 280, and now patient likelihood to definitely recommend the hospital 
after considering the effect of a merger over time. All three mortality rates are positively 
associated with each other, and all three readmission rates are positively correlated with 
each other as well. Moreover, the each mortality rate has a negative relationship with 
readmission rate for all three conditions. AMI mortality rate is negatively associated with 
overall hospital rating; likelihood to definitely recommend a hospital; and nonprofit and 
for-profit hospitals. Government hospitals are negatively associated with AMI, HF, and 
PN readmission rates as well as both HCAHPS measures. Nonprofit hospitals are 
negatively associated with all three mortality rates and both patient satisfaction measures. 
Finally, proprietary hospitals are positively correlated with HF mortality rates, PN 
mortality and readmission rates, and both HCAHPS measures. Medicare payments for 
AMI are negatively associated with the interaction term, while payments for HF and PN 
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are positively associated with the interaction term. Medicare reimbursements for all three 
conditions are positively correlated with government and nonprofit hospital types but 
negatively correlated with for-profit hospitals. 
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Table 4. Correlation values between all study variables. 
 
AFTER MERGED AFTER*MERGED MORT_AMI READM_AMI MORT_HF READM_HF MORT_PN READM_PN 
AFTER 1.00 -0.10 0.58 -0.02 -0.52 0.30 -0.39 0.48 -0.32 
MERGED -0.10 1.00 0.53 0.18 -0.23 0.20 -0.26 0.15 -0.21 
AFTER*MERGED 0.58 0.53 1.00 0.20 -0.59 0.42 -0.57 0.49 -0.41 
MORT_AMI -0.02 0.18 0.20 1.00 -0.38 0.30 -0.26 0.16 -0.39 
READM_AMI -0.52 -0.23 -0.59 -0.38 1.00 -0.58 0.71 -0.59 0.57 
MORT_HF 0.30 0.20 0.42 0.30 -0.58 1.00 -0.77 0.68 -0.42 
READM_HF -0.39 -0.26 -0.57 -0.26 0.71 -0.77 1.00 -0.68 0.61 
MORT_PN 0.48 0.15 0.49 0.16 -0.59 0.68 -0.68 1.00 -0.39 
READM_PN -0.32 -0.21 -0.41 -0.39 0.57 -0.42 0.61 -0.39 1.00 
HSP_9_10 0.17 -0.06 0.08 -0.14 -0.21 0.07 -0.23 0.02 -0.22 
REC_Y 0.03 -0.10 -0.04 -0.13 -0.11 0.01 -0.15 -0.09 -0.15 
GOVT 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.27 -0.07 0.08 -0.09 0.08 -0.13 
NONPROFIT -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.17 0.10 -0.09 0.09 -0.12 0.05 
FORPROFIT 0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.08 
PAYM_AMI -0.21 0.07 -0.09 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.13 -0.13 0.27 
PAYM_HF -0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.24 
PAYM_PN -0.07 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.08 -0.04 0.25 
UNITS 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.08 -0.16 0.04 -0.08 
YEAR 0.11 0.15 0.06 -0.36 -0.10 -0.10 0.01 0.18 -0.05 
 HSP_9_10 REC_Y GOVT NONPROFIT FORPROFIT PAYM_AMI PAYM_HF PAYM_PN UNITS YEAR 
AFTER 0.17 0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.05 -0.21 -0.02 -0.07 0.04 0.11 
MERGED -0.06 -0.10 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.15 
AFTER*MERGED 0.08 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.09 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.06 
MORT_AMI -0.14 -0.13 0.27 -0.17 -0.08 0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.36 
READM_AMI -0.21 -0.11 -0.07 0.10 -0.06 0.22 0.11 0.15 -0.02 -0.10 
MORT_HF 0.07 0.01 0.08 -0.09 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.08 -0.10 
READM_HF -0.23 -0.15 -0.09 0.09 -0.03 0.13 0.06 0.08 -0.16 0.01 
MORT_PN 0.02 -0.09 0.08 -0.12 0.09 -0.13 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.18 
READM_PN -0.22 -0.15 -0.13 0.05 0.08 0.27 0.24 0.25 -0.08 -0.05 
HSP_9_10 1.00 0.92 -0.17 -0.07 0.30 -0.39 -0.39 -0.41 -0.13 0.03 
REC_Y 0.92 1.00 -0.10 -0.07 0.22 -0.25 -0.28 -0.29 -0.03 -0.07 
GOVT -0.17 -0.10 1.00 -0.73 -0.14 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.17 -0.29 
NONPROFIT -0.07 -0.07 -0.73 1.00 -0.57 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.20 
FORPROFIT 0.30 0.22 -0.14 -0.57 1.00 -0.14 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 0.06 
PAYM_AMI -0.39 -0.25 0.08 0.03 -0.14 1.00 0.88 0.90 0.32 -0.23 
PAYM_HF -0.39 -0.28 0.04 0.03 -0.10 0.88 1.00 0.98 0.29 -0.08 
PAYM_PN -0.41 -0.29 0.06 0.03 -0.12 0.90 0.98 1.00 0.29 -0.12 
UNITS -0.13 -0.03 0.17 -0.06 -0.12 0.32 0.29 0.29 1.00 -0.12 
YEAR 0.03 -0.07 -0.29 0.20 0.06 -0.23 -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 1.00 
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 All OLS regressions were run using EViews. Table 5 presents the estimates of the 
effects of the DID variables on patient quality outcomes as outlined in Equation 1. Only 
AMI mortality rate, AMI readmission rate, and PN readmission rate significantly 
decreased from the year before the merge to the year after the merge. All three 
conditions, however, had mortality and readmission rates that were significantly impacted 
by the combined effect of the presence of a merger on an acquired hospital over the three-
year period centered on the year of the merge. All mortality rates increased while all 
readmission rates decreased as a result of a hospital merger over time, on average, ceteris 
paribus. The coefficient of 2.67 on the interaction term in regression (5), for example, 
indicates that the increase in PN mortality rate over the three-year time period centered 
on the year of a hospital merger was 1.96 percentage points greater, on average, than the 
increase in PN mortality rate over three years for hospitals that did not merge. A 
graphical representation of this significant difference is illustrated in Figure 1. HF 
readmission rates experienced the largest absolute change of all six measures, with 
merged hospitals possessing an average 4.20 percent lower HF readmission rate the year 
after the merge compared to the matched unmerged hospitals, ceteris paribus. HF also 
had the greatest magnitude change in mortality rate of the three conditions, with merged 
hospitals possessing an average 2.97 percent higher HF mortality rate the year after the 
merge compared to the matched unmerged hospitals, ceteris paribus. 
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Table 5.  Mortality and readmission rates as a function of DID variables. 
 Dependent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
Variables 
MORT_AMI READM_AMI MORT_HF READM_HF MORT_PN READM_PN 
AFTER -1.13* 
(0.59) 
-1.63*** 
(0.47) 
0.51 
(0.69) 
-0.84 
(0.66) 
1.77*** 
(0.63) 
-0.76* 
(0.44) 
       
MERGED  0.01 
(0.59) 
-0.22 
(0.45) 
-0.06 
(0.69) 
0.04 
(0.66) 
-0.35 
(0.63) 
-0.28 
(0.44) 
       
AFTER*MERGED 1.96** 
(0.84) 
-2.36*** 
(0.65) 
2.97*** 
(0.98) 
-4.20*** 
(0.93) 
2.67*** 
(0.89) 
-1.33** 
(0.63) 
       
R-squared 0.06 0.40 0.17 0.32 0.27 0.17 
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.39 0.15 0.30 0.25 0.15 
Number of 
observations 
175 171 176 176 176 176 
Note: The standard errors are presented in parentheses.  For OLS regressions, the values in the table represent the coefficients 
for each independent variable.   
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Graphical representation of difference-in-differences due to the effect of a 
hospital M&A on various quality and cost metrics.  
 
 
Table 6 shows the inclusion of the two hospital ownership dummy variables, the 
constant term that represents the nonprofit hospital category, and the three condition-
specific mortality rates as independent variables. Regression specifications (1), (2), (3), 
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(4), (5), and (6) followed Equation 2; and specifications (2a), (4a), and (6a) followed 
Equation 3. Even with the addition of these variables, all regressions except specification 
(6a) yielded statistically significant coefficients for the interaction term, a result 
indicating that a merge did have a notable effect on 30-day patient outcome rates for 
AMI, HF, and PN. Again, all mortality rates have a positive coefficient on the interaction 
term, with HF mortality having the largest value, and all readmission rates have a 
negative coefficient on the interaction term, with the greatest negative value for HF 
readmission when controlling only for the DID variables and ownership in column (4). 
Even though the magnitudes of the coefficients on each condition-specific readmission 
rate decrease when controlling for more factors, the fact that they still retain a negative 
sign and the same level of significance, except for column (6a), suggests a prominent 
effect of hospital mergers on hospital quality of care.  
Hospital ownership largely did not seem to have a significant effect on 
performance on the selected mortality and readmission quality measures except for AMI 
and PN mortality. Government-owned hospitals had a 1.90 percent and 1.39 percent 
higher AMI mortality rate and PN mortality rate, respectively, than nonprofit hospitals. 
For-profit hospitals, on the other hand, revealed no significant differences in quality 
outcomes from nonprofit hospitals. Furthermore, increases in each mortality rate are 
shown to result in decreases in the corresponding readmission rates for AMI, HF, and 
PN, holding other variables constant. The decrease in HF readmission rate consequent a 1 
percentage point increase in the condition-specific mortality rate is more than twice the 
decrease for AMI readmission rate and more than five times that for PN.  
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Table 6.  Mortality and readmission rates as a function of all independent variables. 
  Dependent Variables 
 (1) (2) (2a) (3) (4) (4a) (5) (6) (6a) 
Independent Variables MORT_AMI READM_AMI READM_AMI MORT_HF READM_HF READM_HF MORT_PN READM_PN READM_PN 
AFTER -1.09* 
(0.58) 
-1.62*** 
(0.47) 
-1.98*** 
(0.44) 
0.52 
(0.70) 
-0.85 
(0.66) 
-0.51 
(0.48) 
1.78*** 
(0.62) 
-0.77* 
(0.44) 
-0.56 
(0.45) 
 
MERGED  0.01 
(0.57) 
-0.23 
(0.45) 
-0.22 
(0.42) 
-0.05 
(0.70) 
0.03 
(0.66) 
-0.01 
(0.48) 
-0.32 
(0.62) 
-0.28 
(0.44) 
-0.32 
(0.44) 
 
AFTER*MERGED 1.92** 
(0.81) 
-2.35*** 
(0.65) 
-1.75*** 
(0.61) 
2.95*** 
(0.98) 
-4.18*** 
(0.93) 
-2.25*** 
(0.69) 
2.67*** 
(0.88) 
-1.32** 
(0.63) 
-1.01 
(0.64) 
 
C  15.42*** 
(0.42) 
20.21*** 
(0.33) 
24.88*** 
(0.92) 
10.89*** 
(0.52) 
24.79*** 
(0.49) 
31.92*** 
(0.67) 
11.29*** 
(0.46) 
18.70*** 
(0.33) 
20.02*** 
(0.69) 
 
GOVT 1.90*** 
(0.57) 
-0.57 
(0.45) 
0.01 
(0.43) 
0.69 
(0.69) 
-0.89 
(0.65) 
-0.43 
(0.48) 
1.39** 
(0.62) 
-0.47 
(0.44) 
-0.31 
(0.44) 
 
FORPROFIT -0.33 
(0.65) 
-0.47 
(0.52) 
-0.57 
(0.48) 
0.32 
(0.79) 
-0.55 
(0.74) 
-0.34 
(0.54) 
1.05 
(0.70) 
0.13 
(0.50) 
0.26 
(0.50) 
 
MORT_AMI - - -0.30*** 
(0.06) 
- - - - - - 
 
 
MORT_HF - - - - - -0.65*** 
(0.05) 
- - - 
 
 
MORT_PN - - - - - - - - -0.12** 
(0.05) 
 
R-squared 0.12 0.40 0.49 0.17 0.33 0.65 0.29 0.17 0.20 
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.39 0.48 0.15 0.31 0.63 0.27 0.15 0.17 
Number of 
observations 
175 171 171 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Note: The standard errors are presented in parentheses.  For OLS regressions, the values in the table represent the coefficients for each independent variable.   
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
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 Following analysis of mergers on AMI, HF, and PN mortality and readmission rates, the 
specifications in Table 7 did not yield significant effects of hospital mergers on the two global 
HCAHPS scores. Regressions (1) and (2) followed Equation 1, and regressions (1a) and (2a) 
followed Equation 2. Contrary to the results in Table 6 comparing the quality outcomes for the 
different hospital ownership types, significant differences in patient satisfaction scores are seen 
between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals but not between government-owned and nonprofit 
hospitals. For-profit hospitals showed a greater patient likelihood to rate the hospital a 9 or a 10 
and to definitely recommend the hospital than did nonprofit hospitals. 
 
Table 7.  Global patient satisfaction measures as a function of DID and hospital 
ownership variables. 
 Dependent Variables 
 (1) (1a) (2) (2a) 
Independent Variables HSP_9_10 HSP_9_10 REC_Y REC_Y 
AFTER 1.02 
(1.72) 
0.89 
(1.69) 
-0.73 
(1.99) 
-0.82 
(1.98) 
     
MERGED  -1.66 
(1.72) 
-1.54 
(1.69) 
-2.14 
(1.99) 
-2.04 
(1.98) 
     
AFTER*MERGED 1.36 
(2.43) 
1.38 
(2.39) 
0.80 
(2.81) 
0.80 
(2.80) 
     
C - 67.68*** 
(1.25) 
- 71.48*** 
(1.47) 
     
GOVT - -0.78 
(1.67) 
- -0.01 
(1.97) 
     
FORPROFIT - 5.08*** 
(1.90) 
- 4.19* 
(2.24) 
     
R-squared 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03 
Adjusted R-squared -0.0003 0.03 -0.01 0.002 
Number of observations 176 176 176 176 
Note: The standard errors are presented in parentheses.  For OLS regressions, the values in the table represent the 
coefficients for each independent variable.   
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 8 presents the regression coefficients on the three DID variables, the three 
hospital ownership types modeled by two dummy variables and the constant term, and 
the six mortality and readmission rates and hospital overall rating quality measures when 
analyzing their effects on median Medicare payments for AMI, HF, and PN patients 
discharged alive with MCC. Regression specifications (1), (2), and (3) were modelled by 
Equation 4; (1a), (2a), and (3a) were modelled by Equation 5; and (1b), (2b), and (3b) 
followed Equation 6. AMI was the only condition that showed significant decreases in 
Medicare payment over time in columns (1) and (1a). None of the Medicare 
reimbursement rates were significantly different over time consequent a hospital merger 
and also saw largely insignificant effects from the corresponding condition mortality and 
readmission rates; PN readmission rate was the only patient outcome measure that 
possessed a significant coefficient. Government-owned and for-profit hospitals did not 
show significant differences from nonprofit hospitals for all three MS-DRG payments. 
Interestingly, the hospital rating coefficient for each condition’s MS-DRG reimbursement 
amount was significantly negative. 
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Table 8.  Median Medicare payments as a function of all variables. 
 Dependent Variables 
 (1) (1a) (1b) (2) (2a) (2b) (3) (3a) (3b) 
Independent Variables PAYM_AMI PAYM_AMI PAYM_AMI PAYM_HF PAYM_HF PAYM_HF PAYM_PN PAYM_PN PAYM_PN 
AFTER -1,028.42** 
(451.49) 
-1,015.10** 
(452.41) 
-546.06 
(455.59) 
-90.43 
(316.88) 
-87.77 
(318.68) 
-24.32 
(293.75) 
-202.66 
(320.71) 
-194.80 
(321.99) 
-25.00 
(300.14) 
          
MERGED  222.00 
(440.60) 
209.36 
(441.41) 
92.99 
(411.63) 
53.23 
(315.06) 
49.46 
(316.78) 
-65.03 
(291.25) 
99.84 
(318.86) 
92.40 
(320.07) 
12.88 
(292.13) 
          
AFTER*MERGED 178.84 
(638.50) 
167.30 
(639.81) 
354.84 
(627.86) 
26.92 
(446.85) 
28.03 
(449.19) 
39.83 
(435.84) 
16.59 
(452.25) 
16.18 
(453.86) 
282.24 
(426.07) 
          
C - 11,896.22*** 
(327.37) 
15,763.51*** 
(2,875.71) 
- 9,442.96*** 
(234.35) 
13,505.46*** 
(1,982.06) 
- 9,243.12*** 
(236.78) 
11,974.75*** 
(1,623.56) 
          
GOVT - 205.47 
(446.88) 
51.09 
(430.27) 
- -83.91 
(314.61) 
-167.34 
(290.57) 
- -31.89 
(317.88) 
-23.20 
(293.44) 
          
FORPROFIT - -556.36 
(522.39) 
20.86 
(502.31) 
- -165.75 
(357.61) 
208.04 
(334.75) 
- -327.37 
(361.33) 
22.63 
(338.36) 
          
MORT_AMI - - 17.47 
(61.57) 
- - - - - - 
          
READM_AMI - - 100.56 
(79.90) 
- - - - - - 
          
MORT_HF - - - - - 55.06 
(44.75) 
- - - 
          
READM_HF - - - - - 18.71 
(47.98) 
- - - 
          
MORT_PN - - - - - - - - -8.10 
(36.56) 
          
READM_PN - - - - - - - - 114.55** 
(52.28) 
          
HSP_9_10 - - -90.99*** 
(20.51) 
- - -75.73*** 
(13.56) 
- - -70.65*** 
(13.58) 
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.001 0.003 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.20 
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.14 -0.02 -0.03 0.14 -0.01 -0.02 0.16  
Number of observations 168 168 166 175 175 175 175 175 175 
Note: The standard errors are presented in parentheses.  For OLS regressions, the values in the table represent the coefficients for each independent variable.   
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
 
Hospital M&As generate large-scale, institutional changes that have not been found 
to be uniform across all target hospitals. This chapter will analyze the results presented 
previously and discuss how this study either adds to existing literature or sheds new light 
on the effects of hospital M&As on healthcare quality and cost.  
When analyzing AMI, HF, and PN mortality and readmission rates as a function 
of the three DID variables in Table 5, both measures for each condition showed 
significant changes as a result of a merger or acquisition beyond what would have 
occurred simply over time, without the presence of a merger. All mortality rates 
increased while all readmission rates decreased, and these results align with Hayford et 
al.’s (2012) findings of increased mortality rates and Suter et al.’s (2014) findings of 
decreased readmission rates after a merger. Congruent with all mortality rates changing 
in one direction and all readmission rates changing in the other, Table 4 reveals a positive 
relationship among all three mortality rates as well as among all readmission rates for 
AMI, HF, and PN. This observation may be due to hospitals with poor performance on 
one quality metric exhibiting suboptimal performance on other similar quality metrics as 
well, and the same concept can be applied for high-performing hospitals.  
There was some variation in the magnitude of the effects of hospital mergers on 
mortality and readmission rates. HF possessed the greatest positive coefficients on the 
interaction term with mortality as the dependent variable in column (3) of both Tables 5 
and 6; HF also possessed the largest negative coefficients on the interaction term with 
readmission as the dependent variable in column (4) of Table 5 and in columns (4) and 
(4a) of Table 6. The fact that HF mortality and readmission rates were affected most 
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prominently may support why previous studies have found only this condition, not AMI 
nor PN, to show an overall increase in mortality and an association between mortality and 
readmission, and why McIlvennan et al. (2015) analyzed the inverse relationship between 
mortality and readmission rate only for HF (Krumholtz et al., 2013; Suter et al., 2014). It 
is unclear why much of the compelling evidence concerning these two quality outcomes 
pertains to HF. There may be elements to the disease and specific courses of treatment 
themselves that cause HF to show different patterns and relationships between mortality 
and readmission rates than AMI and PN. These previous studies all questioned the 
strength of the correlation between mortality and readmission rates due to their finding of 
HF to be the only condition yielding moderate results at best. If higher mortality rates did 
lead to healthier patients being discharged with a lower risk of readmission, this inverse 
relationship should have been observed across AMI, HF, and PN. 
Despite these findings, the results of this study illustrate statistically significant, 
negative associations between all three condition-specific mortality and readmission 
rates, regardless of the fact that AMI’s and PN’s quality outcomes did not show changes 
as large as those for HF. Table 4 shows this negative relationship as do the regression 
results in specifications (2a), (4a), and (6a) of Table 6, holding other variables constant. 
There are some potential reasons for observing this correlation between mortality and 
readmission. First, readmissions could be inversely affected by the competing risk of 
death, such that a patient who dies during an index episode of care can never be 
readmitted. Therefore, if a hospital has a higher mortality rate, then a smaller proportion 
of its discharged patients are eligible for readmission. On the other hand, if a hospital has 
a lower mortality rate due to improved quality of care, the greater possible readmission 
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rate may be a consequence of this successful care (Gorodeski et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
some hospitals may have a lower threshold for admission and readmission that would 
cause them to hospitalize lower-acuity patients. As a result, readmission rates would be 
inflated and mortality rates reduced (McIlvennan et al., 2015). 
The opposite signs of the significant coefficients on the interaction term, positive 
for mortality and negative for readmission, in Table 6 corroborate the inverse relationship 
between condition-specific mortality and readmission rates found in columns (2a), (4a), 
and (6a) because following a hospital merger, mortality and readmission are seen to be 
affected in opposing directions. Table 6 controls for additional variables than those 
presented in Table 5, and the fact that the coefficients on the interaction terms are still 
significant supports the robustness of the effect of hospital mergers on healthcare quality 
outcomes. Hospital merger events often occur to relieve a hospital from bankruptcy or 
another reason for unsustainability, and the acquiring entity usually reallocates resources 
to the target hospital to keep it operational. This increase in available resources in turn 
may lead to infrastructure expansion and, consequently, increased treatment intensity. An 
increased provision of surgeries for AMI, HF, and PN may improve the length or quality 
of life for some patients, and hospitals that perform higher volumes of procedures tend to 
have better outcomes (Hayford, 2012). Therefore, a smaller group of discharged patients 
eligible for readmission due to higher mortality rates coupled with the increase in patient 
outcomes from merger-induced procedural volume increases could very well lead to 
lower readmission rates across the board (Birkmeyer et al., 2002; Hayford, 2012; Kizer, 
2003). 
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The significant decreases in AMI, HF, and PN readmission rates found in this 
study may also be explained by policymakers’ emphasis on reducing 30-day readmission 
rates. The widening adoption of the HCAHPS Survey and public reporting of hospital 
scores on Hospital Compare has incentivized hospitals to dedicate more attention and 
resources to improving patient experiences and outcomes. Especially with the growth of 
publicly accessible healthcare information and the consumer tendency to research this 
information to guide their health-related decision-making, a respectable public image is 
essential if a hospital wants to remain competitive in the market for prospective patients. 
The major driver behind this increased pressure to perform well on publicly accountable 
measures is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, which 
established the Hospital VBP Program in 2011 and the Hospital Readmission Reduction 
Program (HRRP) in 2012. The VBP program marked the first time hospitals began being 
paid based on their care quality, not quantity, and applies to payments beginning in Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2013 for hospitals under the IPPS. Under VBP, CMS withholds a small 
percentage – approximately 1 to 2 percentage points – of the base DRG reimbursement 
paid to hospitals that can be earned back based on either how well they perform on each 
measure or how much they improve their performance on each measure compared to 
their performance during a baseline period. If hospitals perform well enough to be 
reimbursed beyond the initial withhold, they effectively earn a net bonus. HCAHPS 
scores have comprised a consistent domain in every year’s VBP program, along with 
clinical process of care measures, and outcome measures including mortality and 
readmission rates were added to the program starting FY 2014 (OPPS VBP Final Rule 
11.1.11).  While VBP allows hospitals to receive a payment bonus, the HRRP is strictly a 
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penalty program that reduces payments to hospitals with excess all-cause readmissions 
within 30 days of discharge. Since its implementation, the HRRP included only AMI, 
HF, and PN as applicable conditions during the five years relevant to this study until 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and elective total hip or total knee 
replacement were added in 2015 and coronary artery bypass grafts (CABG) in 2017 
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services). In response to these federal regulations and 
pay-for-performance programs that financially incentivize hospitals to enhance their 
quality of care, it is not surprising that readmission rates have improved as a result (Suter 
et al., 2014). 
Considering that one of the main reasons hospitals merge is to avoid financial 
insolvency and to recover the capacity to operate effectively, engaging in a merger would 
allow underperforming hospitals or those at risk of closure to regain footing in being able 
to adhere to the policies mandated in the ACA. Mergers may place a target hospital under 
a large healthcare system that can provide necessary infrastructure and staffing or even 
introduce new operations and informatics that will help streamline healthcare delivery. 
Therefore, the ACA and associated pressures from federal performance-based programs 
like the VBP and HRRP strongly encourage M&As as a means to consolidate healthcare 
goods and services for quality improvement on outcomes measures crucial for CMS 
reimbursement. 
This heavy focus on readmissions for AMI, HF, and PN, however, may be 
misguided because only a small proportion of 30-day readmissions are preventable; only 
12 percent were found preventable in studies that used clinical data. Hospital readmission 
rates are affected predominantly by the composition of a hospital’s patient population and 
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community resources, and hospitals have little control over factors such as the incidence 
of mental illness and poverty as well as potentially poor social support for patients. As a 
result, the immense efforts hospitals are dedicating towards reducing readmissions may 
be detracting from the attention and resources that could be spent improving inpatient 
safety and mortality rates (Joynt and Jha, 2012).  Thus, the decreased readmission rates 
over time as a consequence of a hospital merger, shown in Tables 5 and 6, can be 
explained in part by intense pressures from federal healthcare reform programs to earn 
reimbursements through fewer 30-day unplanned readmissions. The increased mortality 
rates, subsequently, may be a byproduct of potentially misappropriated resource and time 
allocation that strives to reduce readmissions that are largely unavoidable rather than to 
emphasize inpatient safety and death prevention. 
Although the data in Table 4 show that the two global HCAHPS measures are 
positively associated with time, the regression results in Table 7 do not support the same 
conclusion. The lack of significant evidence of improved patient satisfaction scores over 
time is surprising because of the revolutionary federal policies and programs of 
healthcare reform that have placed considerable focus on increasing access to and quality 
of care while reducing medical expenditures. Since hospitals are increasingly held 
accountable for their performance on patient outcomes and satisfaction scores through 
public reporting and value-based reimbursement, it would have been expected for 
hospitals to prioritize improving patient experience. Moreover, a merged hospital can 
receive additional resources and staff from its acquirer to facilitate increased and more 
efficient operations. However, Table 7 shows no significant changes in hospital overall 
rating or patient likelihood to definitely recommend a hospital as a function of time or a 
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merger. It could be that one year post-merger is not an adequate amount of time for all 
operational adjustments to a target hospital to be fully implemented and integrated. Since 
traditional methods of care delivery and operation may undergo considerable changes 
during this transition period, existing and potentially new staff alike may be spending 
their time and effort trying to accustom themselves to a shifting environment rather than 
focusing on performing at their highest capacity for direct patient care. Delays due to 
tedious administrative protocols and staff confusion regarding new procedures or medical 
technology would adversely affect patient care and as a result, patient satisfaction. 
The significant increases in mortality rate and decreases in readmission rates, as 
shown in Tables 5 and 6, may also contribute to negligible changes in global HCAHPS 
scores. Since readmissions do not necessarily entail death, patients may derive greater 
satisfaction from a higher chance of surviving their hospitalization without being injured 
than from a lower probability of being readmitted to the hospital (Joynt and Jha, 2012). 
The quality of care and interaction with the staff a patient experiences while in the 
hospital play extremely important roles in shaping the patient’s perception of care, and an 
injury-free inpatient stay is much preferred to one in which patient safety is 
compromised. Therefore, the fact that mortality rates were found to increase for AMI, 
HF, and PN after a merger could be an explanatory factor for the lack of significant 
increases in patient satisfaction scores over time consequent a hospital merger deal. 
Similar to previous studies that found no marked differences in quality outcomes 
based on hospital ownership type, nonprofit and for-profit hospitals did not show any 
significant differences in mortality or readmission rates for any of the three conditions 
(McClellan and Staiger, 2000; Sloan and Taylor, 1999; Sloan et al., 2001). Table 6 does 
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reveal, however, that nonprofit hospitals perform significantly better than government-
owned hospitals, though only on AMI and PN mortality rates. Table 4 also shows that 
these two outcome measures have a positive correlation with public, government 
hospitals and a negative correlation with private, nonprofit hospitals. This result provides 
additional insight into how public and private hospitals compare and supports existing 
literature that concluded that private hospitals deliver greater quality of care. Many 
causes may factor into why this maybe so. Private institutions usually have a greater 
proportion of their patient population possessing medical insurance, whether it be private 
or through their employers. Therefore, these patients are better able to pay for the cost of 
their healthcare goods and services, and their hospitals in turn have a greater capacity to 
invest in adequate infrastructure and staff needed to improve care and patient outcomes 
(Basu et al., 2012). 
Public hospitals are also commonly referred to as safety net hospitals because 
they accept patients regardless of insurance status (Werner et al., 2008). Thus, public 
hospitals are usually very impacted with patients who cannot pay for emergency and 
acute care and, as a result, often have long queues and patient wait times. This suboptimal 
access to care can cause a substantial amount of stress for both patients and healthcare 
staff, especially when hospital personnel are overworked due to a seemingly unending 
patient flow. As a consequence, overwhelmed and overextended staff are more prone to 
medical errors, and patients under a higher level of stress are more likely to experience 
adverse health effects. These characteristic burdens of public, government-owned 
hospitals, in turn, may result in higher 30-day mortality rates. 
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Despite the findings of government hospitals performing more poorly than 
nonprofit hospitals on two of the three condition-specific mortality measures, this 
relationship does not translate for patient perception and satisfaction scores. Table 7 
illustrates significant differences in global HCAHPS scores between nonprofit hospitals 
and for-profit hospitals, but not between nonprofit and government hospitals. Columns 
(1a) and (2a) show that for-profit hospitals score higher than nonprofit hospitals for 
overall rating and for likelihood of definitely recommending the hospital. Even though 
this result does not reflect previous findings that on average, for-profit hospitals tend to 
have higher mortality or other adverse event rates than nonprofit hospitals (McClellan 
and Staiger, 2000), it does align with existing literature on consumer perceptions of 
hospitals based on ownership-related dimensions. Since nonprofit hospitals are 
sometimes portrayed in the media as desperately needing capital due to high debt-to-asset 
ratios, consumers are likely to view for-profit hospitals as more capable, coordinated, and 
efficient in their care delivery due to adequate resources and infrastructure (Drevs et al., 
2014; Sloan et al., 2003). Furthermore, for-profit hospitals are more likely to offer 
profitable services that are often complex and not available everywhere, such as open-
heart surgeries (Horwitz, 2005). Access to tertiary care such as complicated but life-
saving surgeries may contribute to higher global ratings because these proprietary 
hospitals offer necessary services that patients cannot find in other medical facilities. 
Additionally, some for-profit hospitals employ customer relationship management 
programs and affiliation with social causes or welfare initiatives to improve patient 
satisfaction, especially to address potential public perception of the hospital’s conflict of 
interest between making a profit and providing philanthropic healthcare to patients 
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(Akinci et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2008; Lichtenstein et al., 2004). Thus, hospital ownership 
status has differing effects depending on the quality measure under consideration. 
Nonprofit hospitals seem to have significantly lower AMI and PN mortality rates than 
government hospitals, but they also appear to possess lower global HCAHPS scores than 
for-profit hospitals. 
Analysis of the effect of the DID variables, hospital ownership, and quality 
outcomes on Medicare payments showed the least amount of significant evidence. All 
three Medicare reimbursement amounts were not significantly affected by a hospital 
merger over time or by hospital ownership status, as reported in Table 8. It may be that 
one year post-consolidation is not sufficient in markedly changing the surrounding 
market and thus the wage index that contributes to each FY’s base payment rate 
calculation. 
It is worth noting the fact that the hospital overall rating coefficients in columns 
(1b), (2b), and (3b) of Table 8 for each condition’s MS-DRG reimbursement amount is 
significantly negative. This result conflicts with intuitive reasoning because it would be 
expected that hospitals with higher overall ratings would have higher reimbursements. 
However, since the payment variables in this study concern predetermined MS-DRG 
reimbursements, payment amounts comprise all services associated with an inpatient stay 
for a particular condition. Though each DRG is given a weight reflecting the average 
relative costliness of cases in that group compared with the average Medicare case, high 
cost outliers would increase the reimbursement amount for patients who are sicker and 
require more complex care. On the other hand, these outlier cases could also entail 
patients who potentially acquire iatrogenic illnesses or are subject to extraordinarily 
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severe overdiagnosis and overtreatment. These latter two instances would place the 
patient at risk, unnecessarily elevate healthcare costs, and be cause for lower patient 
satisfaction and overall hospital ratings. Physicians are pressured from financial, legal, 
and professional standpoints to overutilize medical services and technology; their 
reimbursements rely on all the tests and procedures they order, and the constant threat of 
malpractice lawsuits and patients’ desires for what they deem to be thorough care drive 
physicians to overtreat and cover all bases. Much of the care that is provided is 
unnecessary and wasteful, and may even pose harm to patients. Overutilization of 
services is only growing consequent the continual advancement of medical technology, 
and the increases in MS-DRG base payments every year may reflect this trend in 
increasing cost of care at little to no benefit to patients. Therefore, it is the reverse 
causality of higher median Medicare payments for the three MS-DRGs on lower patient 
satisfaction scores that may be significant and worthy of further investigation. 
A behavioral economics approach may also shed light on this phenomenon of 
higher payments being associated with lower overall hospital ratings. A growing body of 
evidence indicates that tangible rewards, especially monetary ones, undermine motivation 
and worsen performance on complex cognitive tasks, especially when intrinsic 
motivation is high (Himmelstein et al., 2014). For example, Medicare payments could 
cause physicians to focus more on how they will be reimbursed for their services rather 
than on how they can optimize these services to best care for their patients. This 
reasoning is supported by the lack of robust associations between the mortality and 
readmission rates and Medicare reimbursement amounts shown in Table 8; other studies 
have similarly found no evidence that financial incentives improve patient outcomes 
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(Flodgren et al., 2011; Scott et al., 2011). These findings may suggest necessary reform 
in the way physicians are compensated for their services so that the inherent desire to 
care for the ill and to enhance the patient experience is not overtaken by the 
preoccupation with maximizing reimbursements. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
This paper examines the effects of hospital mergers and acquisitions on healthcare 
quality and cost. Analyses utilized data on inpatient mortality and readmission rates for 
AMI, HF, and PN, two global HCAHPS measures of overall hospital rating and 
likelihood to recommend the hospital, hospital ownership status, and median Medicare 
reimbursements for MS-DRGs 193, 280, and 291 from hospitals that merged in 2011, 
2012, or 2013 and their matched, unmerged hospitals. 
AMI, HF, and PN mortality and readmission rates show significant changes as a 
result of a merger or acquisition beyond what would have occurred simply over time, 
without the presence of a merger. All mortality rates increased while all readmission rates 
decreased, and a positive relationship was found among all three mortality rates as well 
as among all readmission rates for the three conditions. HF mortality and readmission 
rates were affected most prominently, and it may be due to particularities with the disease 
and associated treatment that cause HF to show different patterns and relationships 
between mortality and readmission rates than AMI and PN. 
This study’s findings of statistically significant, negative associations between all 
three condition-specific mortality and readmission rates further support the inverse 
relationship between the two outcomes rates following a hospital merger. The significant 
decreases in AMI, HF, and PN readmission rates found in this study may be explained in 
part by policymakers’ emphasis on reducing 30-day readmission rates. Federal policies 
like the ACA and associated programs such as Hospital VBP and HRRP incentivize 
hospitals to dedicate more attention and resources to improving patient experiences and 
outcomes. Mergers may facilitate increased performance according to these federal 
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measures because underperforming hospitals or those at severe financial risk would be 
able to obtain necessary infrastructure and staffing from their acquiring entities to 
reinvigorate operations. Therefore, reduced readmission rates consequent a merger is not 
surprising considering the immense federal pressure and emphasis on quality 
improvement. This heavy focus on decreasing readmission rates, however, may cause 
hospitals to forego equally robust efforts in enhancing other important measures like 
mortality rate. As a result, the increased mortality rates found in this study may be a 
byproduct of potentially misappropriated resource and time allocation that strives to 
reduce readmissions that are largely unavoidable rather than to emphasize inpatient safety 
and death prevention.  
 The lack of significant evidence of improved patient satisfaction scores over time 
due to a merger is surprising because hospitals are increasingly held accountable for their 
performance on patient outcomes and satisfaction scores through public reporting and 
value-based reimbursement. It could be that one year post-merger is not an adequate 
amount of time for the newly acquired hospitals to smooth out all the operational 
adjustments or to fully utilize new capital gained through the merger. Delays due to 
tedious administrative protocols and staff confusion regarding new procedures or medical 
technology would adversely affect patient care and as a result, patient satisfaction. 
Additionally, the fact that mortality rates were found to increase for AMI, HF, and PN 
after a merger could be an explanatory factor for the lack of significant increases in 
patient satisfaction scores over time consequent a hospital merger deal because patients 
may prefer an injury-free inpatient stay to one in which their safety is compromised. 
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Nonprofit and for-profit hospitals did not show any significant differences in 
mortality or readmission rates for any of the three conditions, but nonprofit hospitals 
were found to perform significantly better than government-owned hospitals on AMI and 
PN mortality rates. Private institutions usually have a greater proportion of their patient 
population who are able to pay for their care through private insurance. As a result, 
hospitals would have a greater capacity to invest in adequate infrastructure and staff 
needed to improve care and patient outcomes. Another reason that government hospitals 
may have poorer performance than nonprofit hospitals is that public hospitals must care 
for all patients who present there, regardless of their ability to pay. This high volume of 
uninsured patients would stress and overwork staff who are then more prone to making 
potentially harmful mistakes that could contribute to higher 30-day mortality rates.  
 When analyzing the two global HCAHPS scores of overall hospital rating of a 9 
or 10 and the likelihood of definitely recommending the hospital, significant differences 
were found between nonprofit hospitals and for-profit hospitals; for-profit hospitals 
scored higher than nonprofit hospitals on both measures. Proprietary hospitals are more 
likely to offer complex services that patients may not be able to feasibly find elsewhere, 
and these hospitals also probably have the necessary funds and resources to implement 
customer relations programs and patient satisfaction-oriented institutional initiatives.  
 Finally, Medicare payments were not significantly affected by hospital M&As 
over time. This result may reflect the need for a longer time period of analysis such that 
the indices involved in the base payment rate calculation are sufficiently different from 
past years. One result of importance, however, is the fact that hospital overall rating was 
negatively associated with mean Medicare reimbursement for all three MS-DRGs. This 
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relationship could be explained by an above normal prevalence of high cost outliers that 
would increase the reimbursement amount for patients who are sicker and require more 
complex care. Unusually high costs may also be a factor of overdiagnosis and 
overtreatment due to financial, legal, and professional pressures on physicians to 
overutilize medical services and technology. A major unintended shortcoming of 
monetary rewards for the quantity and quality of care physicians provide is the possibility 
that doctors begin to focus more on how they will be paid rather than how they can better 
and more altruistically serve their patients. Additionally, unnecessary care could 
adversely affect patient health, and higher MS-DRG payments from a greater number of 
medical services done could lead to poorer patient outcomes and satisfaction of care.  
Greater efforts should be directed toward improving mortality rates in addition to 
readmission rates. The federal programs currently in place consequent the passage of the 
ACA put a tremendous focus on preventing patient readmissions, but improving inpatient 
safety and mortality metrics should not be any less stressed.  Furthermore, all hospitals, 
regardless of ownership status, should constantly strive to provide patient-centered, 
integrated, and coordinated care so patient experiences continue to improve.  To address 
the potentially misguided physician reimbursement schedules currently in place, it may 
be valuable to consider other, non-financial incentives to enhance quality of care so that 
physicians maintain their altruistic motivations for providing healthcare.  
This study has some limitations that should be addressed. First, all systematic 
differences between hospitals that merge and those that do not merge, such as 
competition, patient case mix, market shares, and hospital location, were not controlled 
for. Second, the research may not have captured all the hospital mergers that occurred in 
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the U.S. Only publicly announced transactions are included in Irving Levin Associates’s 
annual reports. Third, three years may not have been a sufficient time period for hospital 
performance to change significantly; it probably takes longer than one year for the 
merger to have any notable effects. Fourth, health industry changes consequent federal 
healthcare reform policies were not comprehensively incorporated. Beyond what was 
discussed in this paper regarding the ACA, VBP, and HRRP, many other healthcare 
legislations were passed that could possibly have had an effect on the variables in this 
study. Fifth, though there were only a few cases at most with which this is pertinent, the 
analyses did not take into account the new sizes of target hospitals after they were 
acquired. Finally, regressions were not conducted that analyzed the differences between 
government and for-profit hospitals in quality and cost measures; both ownership types 
were only assessed for significant difference in reference to the nonprofit group. 
There are many avenues this study provides whereby to conduct more thorough 
research to better understand the longer-term implications of hospital mergers. It would 
be interesting to study the impacts of a hospital’s state, status as rural or urban, and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which measures market concentration, on propensity 
to merge and how a merger would affect efficiency metrics and staffing composition. 
Additionally, using Medicare spending per beneficiary would allow for broader analysis 
of healthcare costs, and future studies could also look into how M&As affect hospital 
profitability. Since this study used only outcomes measures, the mortality and 
readmissions rates, future studies could investigate how process of care measures are 
impacted by a merger. Lastly, it would be valuable to analyze potential organizational 
culture components associated with successful quality improvements and cost reductions 
Su 63 
 
post-merger and whether cultural resistance in any way hinders these goals after hospital 
M&As.   
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